Teacher Loses Employment Discrimination Case Against School District

What does employment discrimination mean and when is an individual entitled to bring a workplace discrimination claim? How does employment discrimination law apply to Education Law?

 Generally, under Federal and New York State Laws employment discrimination occurs when a person or a group of persons is treated unequally based on race, gender, age, disability, religion, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, veteran status, and political affiliation or beliefs, which has a negative affect on that individual. Therefore, job discrimination is prohibited and several Federal Acts have been enacted to support this objective, such as:

  1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
  2. Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA),
  3. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),
  4. Title I and Title V of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
  5. Civil Rights Act of 1991,
  6. Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and
  7. Title II of the Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act of 2008 (GINA);

 In a recently issued verdict that was tried before the U. S. Eastern District of New York Court in Central Islip, a middle school employee lost a racial discrimination case against Malverne public school officials. A middle school mathematics teacher who was denied a promotion or reassignment initiated the suit. The teacher alleged the District discriminated against him due to his race. At the conclusion of the trial, an eight-member jury examined all the evidence and determined that the teacher had failed to establish the school district and/or its administrators had violated federal laws prohibiting discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, there are several requisite factors which must be considered. In light of these requirements, the federal jury unanimously came to the conclusion that the school’s decision in refusing to promote or reassign the teacher an additional class was not racially motivated and as a result there was no basis to grant the teacher damages.

 Where, however, a court finds that a person has been unlawfully discriminated at their workplace, the substantial remedies are available including, but not limited to, hiring, promotion, backpay, reinstatement, front pay, emotional distress damages, and reasonable accommodation.

 If you have questions or concerns regarding employment discrimination, or have any questions relating to workplace law, call Gilbert Law Group at 631.630.0100.

Contributed by Sakine Oezcan, Esq.

Does Perception Equal Reality for Title VII Employment Discrimination?

One major difference between the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is that the ADA explicitly protects employees who are discriminated against because of an employer’s perception that they are disabled, although in reality they may not be. Title VII employment discrimination, on the other hand, does not recognize the concept of an employer discriminating against an employee based on that employer’s perception that an employee is a member of a protected class. Accordingly, a Title VII plaintiff historically has a higher burden of proof in establishing their prima facie case. Traditionally, although the same act of “discrimination” would not be the basis for an employment discrimination cause of action where the worker is not a member of a protected class, recent case law has demonstrated a trend towards expanding protections under Title VII to include an employer’s perception that an employee is a member of a protected class.

Two recent cases in particular are illustrative of this trend in employment discrimination. In Kallabat v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., a federal judge ordered that a Michigan man’s case on perceived religious discrimination go forward. Mr. Basil Kallabat, a dark-skinned man of Iraqi descent, and a self-proclaimed non-Muslim, suffered an adverse employment action while working as a customer service representative. Even though a Title VII claim based on his color, gender, or national origin would be unimpeachable, Mr. Kallabat’s claim centered on an element of perceived religion. The plaintiff claimed that when he wore a hat backwards and a co-worker said it looked like a “topi” (a skullcap worn by Muslim men for religious reasons) and other workers starting laughing at Plaintiff as a result. Further, on another occasion, there was graffiti etched into the door of a bathroom stall of one of Defendant’s offices depicting two buildings similar to the Twin Towers with a plane hitting one of them and a caption that stated that the plaintiff is learning how to fly. After learning of the graffiti, the Area Manager said that Plaintiff was oversensitive, emotional, and unable to take the joke during a crew meeting. The Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that a reasonable jury could find that the incidents are evidence of discrimination based on the perception that Plaintiff was a Muslim. Similarly, in Arsham v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, an Iranian engineer’s perceived Title VII claim survived summary judgment on the basis that her supervisor’s mistaken belief that she was Indian, and not Iranian, should not save the employer from Title VII liability.

With this potentially looming expansion of workplace religious employment discrimination protection, it is imperative that both management and employees know their respective rights as they relate to federal, state, and municipal ordinances. The Gilbert Law Group can help you navigate this fast changing legal arena.

 Schedule a consultation by calling (631) 630-0100.

 Contributed by Michael B. Engle